June 2007

On September 30th of this year, General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will step down after four years as Vice Chairman and two years as Chairman. Nominated by President Bush, and assuming his post on September 30th 2005, General Pace was the first Marine to serve in either position, and the 16th Chairman since the formation of the JCS. (Editors Note: We hold that Goldwater-Nichols [1986] marked the true formation of the JCS, as opposed to the National Security Act of 1947 which established the JCS, but had to await further legislative and executive changes some 19 years later to become the organization it is today).

To save electrons, the announcement by the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, have been reported variously here, here, and also here . It’s distressing to note that no Dutch written media have reported on this matter BTW. The current Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates was grim when he made the announcement , and the reason for that is clear. Secretary Gates said that a renomination hearing would be “a very contentious process” and would tend to focus on the past, rather than looking ahead to the future. He went on to say; “I just think that a divisive ordeal at this point is not in the interests of the country.”

General Pace owed his nomination to the previous Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and was widely regarded as “Don’s Man” in Congress. The reality however, was markedly different and much more complicated.

Behind the scenes General Pace believed that Guantanamo should be closed, and that the United States should adhere to the Geneva Conventions in it’s treatment of detainees. He supported efforts to reopen a dialog with China, and repeatedly cautioned the political leadership of the folly of risking war with Iran. Last fall, it was General Pace who persuaded civilian and military leaders alike that the time had come to construct a new strategy in Iraq. General Pace however kept these struggles behind the scenes, as is only proper.

The Joint Chiefs do not have direct operational command of troops in battle, and are by law military advisers, with the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. There is an anomaly contained in this structure however.

A Chairman who has held office during a period of militarily successful operations definitely receives some reflected glory. A (perhaps the) classic example of this would be the Chairmanship of General Colin Powell (1989 – 1993). Outside of the political and military environment, he is directly associated with the resounding coalition victories of the first Gulf War. In fact, scholars and historians point to a much more detailed and far reaching chairmanship, than that deployment alone

Under his leadership highly visible and successful operations were carried out. Operation Desert Shield (1990) and Desert Storm (1991). General Powell was an able practitioner of military & political consultations, and worked tirelessly to assure sufficient forces, and both congressional & military/logistical support were available to complete both operations successfully. That is – as said above – the dominant view within the media and the public perception. In fact however, much else was achieved under his 4 years of leadership. His tenure coincided with the end of the Cold War, and his chairmanship saw more changes in the word than any of his predecessors. Powell was the principal architect of the reorientation of US strategy, and the reduction of the armed forces in response to the changed strategic environment. He directed the most significant change in national military strategy since the late 1940′s, devising a strategy which focused on regional and humanitarian crises rather than a sole focus on the Soviet union. Powell’s concept of a “base force” sufficient to maintain the United States superpower satus won the support of then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s and President Bush’s support for a 25% reduction in the size of the armed forces. He forcefully argued against the committment of US ground forces unless there were clearly defined political objectives, and the political willingness to commit sufficient resources to achieve these objectives.

When General Powell retired on September 30th 1993, the role of the Chairman JCS had been substantially enhanced due to his aggressive exercise of the expanded powers granted to the Chairman in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. His tenure as chairman subsequently became the subject of debate among scholars and commentators concerned with the role of the military in policy development.

His successors would argue that his was a tough act to follow, and in more than one way
they would be right in that view. The political calculus in Washington has changed significantly in the past 14 years since the retirement of General Powell, and the executive branch has – some would argue – lost its ability to define precise political goals. The ability of the Chairman to influence specific events has therefore changed also. The administration of President George H.W. Bush was far removed from the atmosphere of the present administration. Former President Bush had a lifetime of political experience in foreign affairs, and a skilled seasoned cadre of advisors that surrounded him. His friendships with leaders worldwide gave him unprecendted access to decision makers in some remarkably fortunate places. Thus was a coalition formed. Not a “coalition of the willing” but a true “allied coalition” with a shared goal, and a defined end game. A Chairman JCS could therefore be an effective actor in an environment which encouraged a “can do” attitude, but one tempered with wisdom and experience, and less burdened by pure ideology than exists at this point in history.

So in just over three months another political casualty of the reign of Donald Rumsfeld will leave office. General Pace’s career is ending because spineless individuals on the Hill are seeking a scapegoat for decisions made by the civilian leadership
aboiut a war that has become deeply divisive and unpopular. The sad reality that the Chairman JCS is not even in the chain of leadership when it comes to operational matters matters nothing in this situation. He’s an adviser, and even with former Chairman Powells’ expertise (and expansion of the role) in mind, at the end of the day, General Powell would have said, with characteristic modesty, “we give our very best advice and reasoning, that’s the role in which we serve the President”. When that advice is rejected by the civilian leadership, the unassailable doctrine of civilian control of the military calls for the Charman to salute smartly and carry out his orders to the best of his ability, and offer up no public dissent.

General Pace has served his country with distinction and honor, recently celebrating his 40th year of service in the Marine Corps. He has clearly carried out some unpopular orders. Nothing about the deployment of forces to Iraq can have made a professional military officer comfortable. To be ordered to carry out a mission, absent the force levels necessary to get the job done, is an affront. To have been ordered to do so with a (former) Secretary of Defense who was hell bent on a deploying a “leaner more agile military force” as his personal legacy, must have been a deeply disturbing task for this Chairman. Knowing the mood of Congressional oversight committees to be so overwhelmingly negative, must have been a daunting thought for General Pace during his periodic trips to the Hill to give testimony.

It is our fervent hope that his successor Admiral Mike Mullen brings the necessary balancing influence(s) of opinion, intellect and negotiating skills to the job that he has demonstrated in the past. Admiral Mullen is a skilled and intellectually agile officer who has clearly shown the ability to rise above parochial interests in order to bring focus to joint support of the mission the Army is tasked with accomplishing.

General Pace sadly joins a number of other officers who have seen their careers irreparably damaged by the Iraq conflict. He is the most senior casualty within the military command structure, but perhaps now the leadership under Secretary of Defense Gates and his new appointee can begin to address the challenges of spending “blood and treasure in distant lands” and arriving at an honorable outcome.

This writer wishes a “fellow Marine” and “boy from Brooklyn” a peaceful and interesting retirement. We mark his departure with sadness though, because a career ought not to end this way.

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